Research

Clearing Conditional Commitments working draft v1

Timothy J. Miano · June 2026 · 46 pp.

Privacy, specification, and custody in a clearinghouse for interdependent action. Three design dials, one result: the welfare-maximizing clearinghouse holds no principal, fixes terms late, and discloses progress only through a k-anonymized aggregate.

Paper (PDF)

Went to Market

June 2026

What happened to everyone who took the threshold mechanic — “this happens only if enough of us commit” — to market across 20 years: PledgeBank, ThePoint/Groupon, Tilt, Kickstarter, and the rest — who survived, who died, and why.

Read the paper

AI methods

This research was produced with substantial AI assistance, directed and reviewed by the author. Models used:

Adversarial cross-checking between independent model runs was used for the literature corpus (claims verified against authoritative indexes) and for the proofs (multi-pass adversarial review). All numerical results originate in seeded, re-runnable scripts. Any remaining errors are the author’s.

Preliminary and incomplete — comments welcome.